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question of whether and how networked intermediaries have (dis)integrating social
effects. In this study, we use public records of configurations of Internet filters in
Alabama public schools and libraries to show how different institutions implement
nominally consistent content standards inconsistently. We argue that these varying
implementations are both significant and troubling for two reasons: first, they overreach
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contribute to a broader epistemic breakdown by fragmenting the kind of information
made available through and across public institutions.
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Sorting the Internet to Filter It: Breitbart Is “Society,” But Jezebel “Adult”
In January 2017, during the Trump presidential transition, radref, an electronic mailing list for
librarians, began discussing a surprising filtering phenomenon. Some members had noticed that
Lightspeed, an Internet filtering provider commonly used by public libraries, categorized Breitbart, the
right-wing tabloid formerly edited by Trump advisor Steve Bannon, as “Society.Politics,”2 while classifying
Jezebel, the feminist blog, as “Adult.”3 Meanwhile, others observed that the filtering system Websense
classified InfoWars, published by noted conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, as “News and Media,” while
classifying Buzzfeed, which publishes both news and media, as “Entertainment.” As the librarians
compared notes on their filtering systems, they encountered other idiosyncratic classifications, with often
surprising implications for the kind of information made (un)available to their patrons through their
institutions.4
In this example, we see the convergence of two different senses in which the Internet is
metaphorically “filtered.” The metaphor of Internet “filters” has historically described “technical blockages
to the free flow of information across the Internet that [actors] put in place or require others to institute”
(Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008, p. 2). In another, more recent sense, the metaphor of “filters” (Pariser, 2011)
has been used to describe algorithmic personalization, especially on social media, that curates and
presents different information about the world to different users, which may undermine democratic
solidarity and consensus (Sunstein, 2009).
In this article, we bring these two ideas together in the context of contemporary Internet filtering
in Alabama public schools and libraries. We compare public records of Internet filtering configurations to
demonstrate that filtering regimes are implemented inconsistently between institutions nominally
governed by the same content standards. We identify three sources of this inconsistency, arising from
strategies used by administrators to tailor global filtering systems to local preferences. We find these
filtering regimes (a) overreach the stated goals of the legislation with which they in principle comply and
(b) may also contribute to a broader epistemic breakdown by fragmenting the kind of information made
available through and across public institutions. We conclude by discussing future research directions to
better understand the lived experience of administrators and patrons who design, deploy, use, and resist
Internet filtering in public institutions.
Design and Execution of This Study
This study draws on data gathered as part of a larger research project that seeks to discover and
associate incidents of censorship in public institutions with everyday geopolitical entities, such as states,
municipalities, and districts, and thus metaphorically “map” the terrain of information made available
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through these institutions in these locations.5 Our primary source materials are public records obtained
from schools and libraries, which, we believe, provide a different, and complementary, perspective from
which to survey this territory compared to more conventional methods, such as surveys and news reports.
We have previously published an article discussing the history and methodology of using state
public records laws for research purposes (Oltmann, Knox, Peterson, & Musgrave, 2015). Although public
records laws are frequently invoked by journalists and activists to uncover source material for their stories
and campaigns, the use of public records requests in scholarly work is less common. Some recent
exceptions include the work of Charles Davis, a journalism professor who has used public records requests
to report on local censorship trends (O’Connor, 2012), and Amy Johnson, an anthropologist who sued the
CIA for failing to turn over records related to the management of its Twitter account as part of her
research on Twitter and global politics (Annear 2017; Johnson, 2017).
Some benefits of our approach include the ability to compel the collection of comprehensive
records from public institutions. For example, other well-known data sets of censorship incidents are
typically maintained by professional advocacy organizations, such as the American Library Association
(ALA), and sourced by local teachers and librarians who report incidents of patron or parent requests for
reconsideration of materials. These data sets often form the basis of news coverage and organizational
decision making. However, they typically exclude curatorial decisions made by professionals or
configurations of technical systems, as well as requests that, for whatever reason, are not reported to the
organization. In principle, requests for public records under compulsion of law should source
more/different data.
Some challenges to this approach include a lack of robust compliance or, conversely, a deluge of
data too voluminous to analyze easily. Responses may depend on whether institutions have the resources,
expertise, and risk tolerance to fully respond to a request. Public records cannot capture what goes
unrecorded in the ephemeral life of institutions; nor, depending on response rates and patterns, are they
necessarily “representative” of some general phenomenon. However, public records requests can provide
primary source materials for study and may point the way toward future research opportunities by making
visible documentary traces of controversies that can be subsequently studied in richer detail.
For this study, we used federal databases from the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(IMLS) and the National Coalition of Education Statistics (NCES) to build a data set of 351 public
institutions—134 public school districts and 217 public library systems—in the state of Alabama.6 This data
set, which used data gathered in 2011 and published in 2013, included names and addresses of the
institutions; we added e-mail addresses based on information posted to institutional websites and other
public sources. We chose to target districts and systems (as opposed to schools and branches) because a
5

More information can be found at the project website (http://mappinginfoaccess.org).

6

For public school districts, we used the Common Core of Data Local Education Agency (School District)

Universe Survey (FY2013) conducted by the National Coalition for Education Statistics. For library
systems, we used the Public Libraries Survey (FY2013) conducted by the Institute for Museum and Library
Services.
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precursor project in Massachusetts showed that public records requests sent to branches were often
escalated to senior administrators for response (Peterson, 2013). We chose Alabama as the first site for
this project because it is alphabetically first among the 50 states. It is worth noting for this study that
Alabama has a relatively weak open records law, with no specified time frame for response or penalties for
noncompliance (Oltmann et al., 2015; Oltmann, Peterson, & Knox, 2017). Because this is the first test of
our approach, it is hard to know whether and how the weakness of the legal compulsion affected our
study. In the broader project, for which we are currently pursuing funding, we intend to apply our
approach across the remaining states and to include such comparisons as both considerations and
findings.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Alabaman open records law (Alabama Open Meetings Act, 2005),
we drafted a letter7 requesting public records related to censorship. For the purposes of this article, this
request asked for the following:
●

Any records related to Internet filtering, including but not limited to
○

any current acceptable use policies, Web publishing policies, or equivalents;

○

any current contracts with Internet filtering services and/or providers;

○

any current categories of content that their provider offers to block, along with which

○

any modifications to the standard configuration of their filter, including lists of sites, services,

categories their institution currently blocks; and
URLs, keywords, or other identifiers that have been specifically configured as forbidden or
allowed (i.e., blacklists/whitelists)
In January 2014, we mailed a paper copy of the request to each of the 351 institutions and also
delivered electronic copies via MuckRock, a citizen journalism service news site that helps individuals file,
track, and organize public records requests. Our requests, as well as all subsequent exchanges and
responsive documents, are publicly available on the MuckRock website.8 We also asked professional
communities of school and library administrators to circulate notices explaining our study to relevant
electronic mailing lists in an attempt to assuage anxieties and increase responses. We ceased to seek new
responses from institutions in November 2014.
At the end of our study, we had received full or partial responses from 222 institutions (138
libraries, 84 schools), which were read and coded by responsiveness to request(s) by one of our authors.
Of these, 107 (71 libraries, 36 schools) acknowledged filtering the Web and identified their filtering
software, and 40 (23 libraries, 17 schools) sent records of Internet filtering configurations. Eight public
libraries said they did not filter the Internet; no public school made the same claim. Responsive
institutions reported using 28 different filtering software systems. Among them, there is no apparent
7

A draft of the letter we sent is published at our project website.

8

All requests and responses are published at https://www.muckrock.com/accounts/profile/GeoCen/
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standard configuration, or even a standard configuration of standards: we received text files, spreadsheets
of links, screenshots of websites, faxes of printouts of screenshots of websites, and other multimodal
responses.

Overview of Internet Filtering in American Public Schools and Libraries
In 2000, after years of pressure from child-protection groups (Minow, 1997), the United States
Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act, or CIPA,which required American public schools
and libraries seeking federal funding to implement a “technology protection measure” (TPM), defined as a
“technology that blocks or filters Internet access to visual depictions that” fall into the specified categories
of obscenity, child pornography, or being harmful to minors (Children’s Internet Protection Act, 2000).
However, the text of CIPA offers no guidance for how stakeholders ought to evaluate if a visual depiction
qualifies as obscene or harmful to minors, or how any disputes over such decisions might be redressed
and resolved.9 It does not specify what features a TPM (or, interchangeably for the purposes of this article,
an Internet filter) should have, or how such features ought to be configured (see Figure 1).
Instead, CIPA delegates these decisions to local authorities (e.g., school administrators and
library directors) who were (and are) free to select, configure, and implement a filter to meet their needs
(Minow, 2004). Anticipating objections on First Amendment grounds, Congress also prescribed that an
administrator at a complying institution “may disable the technology protection measure concerned,
during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose” (CIPA, 2000).
Nonetheless, CIPA was immediately challenged by a coalition, led by the American Library
Association, that argued the bill imposed an unconstitutional condition on public institutions to block
access to constitutionally protected speech. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld CIPA in an unusual
plurality decision with several concurring opinions (United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 2003).
While each opinion applied different reasoning to reach a shared conclusion, all agreed that the interest in
protecting minors from harmful content was compelling, and that the provision to disable filters for adult
patrons rendered the objection moot. Since 2003, all public schools and most public libraries have
implemented technology protection measures as prescribed by CIPA (Caldwell-Stone, 2013).

9

In fact, even the internal definitions referenced within CIPA are often mistaken or circular, sometimes in

revealing ways. For example, although the text of the bill cites Section 1460 of Title 18 of the United
States Code for the meaning of “obscenity,” this section does not define the term obscene but instead
specifies the punishment for those apprehended possessing obscene materials with intent to sell on
federal property. Section 1461, immediately following, does define material that is “nonmailable” on
account of being obscene or crime-inciting; of the six paragraphs enumerating nonmailable materials, five
of them describe information about how to obtain or perform an abortion.
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Figure 1. Scan from the Congressional Record of CIPA, with relevant sections outlined.

As J. C. Bertot and his collaborators have shown in regular surveys conducted over the past two
decades, public institutions, especially libraries, continue to play a major role in providing/mediating
access to the Internet to ordinary people; indeed, “building digitally inclusive communities has become
one of the key functions of public libraries in the United States as well as in many other nations” (Bertot,
Real, & Jaeger, 2016, p. 271). As a result, “any misconceptions about personal computers or broadband
being in virtually all Americans’ homes are quickly dispelled when considering the level of demand that is
currently placed on public libraries’ technological infrastructure” (Bertot et al., 2016, p. 277). A 2014 ALA
policy briefing reported 60 million Americans lacked either a home broadband connection or smartphone,
and that they disproportionately belonged to socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (Batch, 2014). As
such, the constraints and consequences of Internet filtering (a) affect many people and (b) especially
impact the poor, elderly, and less-educated individuals who are less likely to have home broadband.
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These trends hold true for our (arbitrarily) selected field site of Alabama. According to the IMLS,
the 138 libraries in our study reported 4.3 million public Internet computer uses per year; according to the
American Community Survey, the population of the entire state of Alabama is 4.8 million. According to the
2013 Digital Inclusion Survey conducted by Bertot and colleagues, 25% of Alabama libraries reported that
patrons experience a wait time for public access computers (Bertot et al., 2014), which demonstrates the
level of demand for institutional Internet access; the 2014 Digital Inclusion Survey showed that rates and
kinds of Internet usage in Alabama libraries were broadly consistent with national averages (Bertot, Real,
Lee, McDermott, & Jaeger, 2015).
Prior academic studies of CIPA-compliant Internet filtering, published mostly in the library and
information science literature, have, among others, conducted adoption-rate surveys (Comer, 2006),
analyzed differences in adoption between schools and libraries (Jaeger & Yan, 2009), reviewed the impact
of filtering on the role of the library as a public Internet access point (Jaeger, Bertot, McClure, & Langa,
2006), and studied student behavior in filtered and unfiltered school environments (Yan, 2009). Some
have attempted to quantify “error rates” of blocking, typically by creating a list of links that the authors
decided should, or should not, be blocked, and running those links through the filter to see which were or
were not blocked (Resnick, Hansen, & Richardson, 2004). However, we were unable to find any studies of
the specific kinds or configurations of filters implemented across different institutions, and thus how
access to the same information might vary between them.
Meanwhile, the advocacy and jurisprudence regarding Internet filtering, as described above, has
historically figured the controversy as between proponents of free expression and guardians of moral
propriety (Caldwell-Stone, 2013). After the passage of CIPA, some scholars and advocates introduced the
issue of student intellectual development and agency as a consideration for policy makers (Yan, 2009).
Some baseline unpredictability of filtering behavior in libraries had been observed even before Congress
enacted CIPA (Minow, 1997), and a recent policy briefing by the ALA identified “overbroad” filtering as
both a trend among and a challenge for libraries (Batch, 2014). However, the informational, which is to
say political, consequences of inconsistent filtering in public institutions have been largely overlooked in
the academic and professional literature.
Our work builds on and expands this prior work by studying how specific TPMs are actually
implemented. By doing so, we intend to (a) empirically demonstrate idiosyncratic classification practices
that create inconsistent access to information across public institutions, despite nominal standardization
by CIPA, and (b) link this specific inconsistency in public institutions to a general inconsistency, and
resulting fragmentation, ascribed to contemporary information intermediaries.
Conceptual Framework and Analytical Approach
Although most studies of filters and filtering have treated TPMs as universal objects that are
either implemented or not, we instead consider TPMs as disunified objects, with local configurations, that
are implemented differently at every site. This tactic of “localizing the global” (Latour, 2005) helps us
trace the strategies and tactics by which software systems, in cooperation with their designers and users,
bring a “hidden order” (Geiger, 2011) to the chaos of the Internet. Our study thus works to complicate
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simple binaries, such as filtered/unfiltered, connected/disconnected, and censored/uncensored, into a
more robust understanding of an Internet that appears and operates differently depending on where any
given user is situated, both socially and geographically, and how they are mediated by local technologies
and institutions.
For this article, we reviewed the filtering configurations and contracts of the 40 institutions that
submitted responsive records. The previously-described multimodal character of these records made them
difficult not only to compare but also to share in a conventional academic article: responses included
screenshots of configuration panels, lengthy printouts of lists of links, and spreadsheets representing the
output of a database access control list, not all of which are equally amenable to the same methods of
analysis nor representation in a publication.
Because we received so many types of records, from so many different institutions, in the
sections below we selected a subset of records that are typical of those received (in both content and
pattern) and relatively easily reproduced in an academic article. Primarily, these are screenshots of
filtering configurations or lists of links that can be compared against each other to reveal continuities and
discontinuities. This basic technique is common across disciplines (such as history and media studies) that
rely on material artifacts to supplement their textual analysis; we were especially influenced by the
fragmentary documentation used by Latour (1999) and Mol (2002) in their respective studies of transit
systems and the human body, where scraps of records reflexively foreground the uncertainty,
contingency, and precariousness of the study itself. We have also assigned each respondent a pseudonym
to mask their institutional identity.10 The complete data set of records is published and available for review
at the MuckRock website.
Because the core focus of this article is the specific implementation of filters across different
institutions and any (in)consistencies that result, we have organized our findings as three distinct
strategies that emerged as patterns in the records. These sociotechnical strategies are not necessarily
distinct and indeed often overlap. The benefit of this approach is that it makes it easier to see, from the
perspective of a local administrator (i.e., the agent implementing the configuration and producing the
record), how their TPM organizes the Internet into something that can be filtered, how they can tailor their
TPM to their goals, and how different types of TPMs locate the filtering agency in different places. The
result of this approach is to both illustrate and emphasize the widespread inconsistency in implementation
that we found.

10

Pseudonyms were assigned based on the canonical cast of characters drawn from Bruce Schneier’s

(1996) “Applied Cryptography.” We did not promise this to our respondents as a precondition. Instead, it
is a decision we have made after the fact to help shield those who, potentially against their immediate
interests, responded to our request. The deanonymized results are available on the MuckRock site and
with the authors.
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Strategies to Organize and Filter the Internet
Strategy A: Categorizing the Kinds of Content to Filter
As discussed in the overview of filtering in American public institutions, CIPA prescribes a
category model of content to block. The law requires that TPMs block content categorized as obscenity,
child pornography, or being harmful to minors, while offering no guidance on determining how content
should be classified into those categories or how disputes over classification should be resolved. As such,
TPMs are often designed around categories (including, but not limited to, those specified by CIPA) that
local administrators can allow or block.
“Assigning things . . . to categories is a ubiquitous part of work in the modern, bureaucratic
state,” Bowker and Star (1999, p. 284) observed. The design and deployment of categories in filtering
systems can be understood as an example of what Adele Clarke (2016) calls “anticipation work.” Clarke,
working in Star’s tradition, defines anticipation work as the processes and practices by which complex
reality is simplified into usable components of systems. Anticipation work happens both before and during
the design of a system, but always with an eye toward making future tasks more manageable. Categories
can thus help make visible the most salient organizing concepts and immediate goals of software
designers and users.
Consider, for example, the category schema designed and deployed by K9 Web Protection, one of
the most common filtering solutions used by our respondents. Seventeen of our respondents indicated
that they use K9, and four of them provided legible configurations. K9 is a product of Blue Coat Systems,
a network security company acquired by Symantec in June 2016 for $4.65 billion. Free for home use, user
licenses are available to schools and provided to libraries by the state of Alabama through the state
system.11
K9 offers users five preconfigured selections tuned to different levels of permissiveness, ranging
from “high” (protects against all default-level categories plus social interaction and unrated sites) to
“monitor” (allows all categories—only logs traffic). Users who wish to customize their configuration may
select from 24 “commonly blocked categories,” as well as 47 “other categories” for a total of 71 kinds of
content that might be worth filtering. Yet none of these categories cleave to the classification framework
prescribed by CIPA. Instead, they instantiate a different ontological (and moral) order, operating around
and across that contemplated by Congress to anticipate the additional needs of filtering institutions
(Batch, 2014).

11

According to one of our respondents, a director at a small public library, K9 is “is provided to us free of

charge through the state library system,” and is used to “block all pornography sites, sites with sexually
suggestive keywords or content, sites that contain hate based materials, sites that promote terrorism, and
some gambling sites” (see 2014-03-11T10/51/03.522365 Communication.txt, on file with the authors).
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Figure 2. K9 Configuration at Alice Municipal Library.

Figure 2 records the configuration of the municipal library in a small town (pop. ~1,500) in
northeastern Alabama that serves ~3,500 computer users annually. It has a single, part-time librarian
who has implemented a custom configuration of K9 that blocks all 24 “commonly blocked categories”—
including Alternative Sexuality/Lifestyles, Sex Education, and Suspicious—as well as four Other Categories
including Games and Social Networking.
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Figure 3. K9 Configuration at Bob County Library.

By comparison, consider the configuration of K9 in Figure 3, implemented by a county library
located in a county seat (pop. ~15,700) in midwestern Alabama that serves ~6,200 computer users
annually with a staff of two. It has also implemented a custom configuration of K9, but this one blocks
only 10 “commonly blocked categories” and none of the “other” categories. And although the library
blocks Alternative Sexuality/Lifestyles, Intimate Apparel and Adult Content remain unchecked.

4594 C. Peterson, S. M. Oltmann, and E. J. M. Knox

International Journal of Communication 11(2017)

In these cases, the categorization scheme is the same, but the categories selected are different.
Despite operating in similar contexts, serving similar constituents, and using the same software, these two
libraries have implemented very different filtering regimes and thus offer their patrons access to Internet
content that is meaningfully and intentionally different according to the software designed to filter it. The
discrepancy invites further research as to why these decisions were made. Why are there different content
standards for similar constituencies? And why, at both institutions, is blocking queer content (described
with the euphemism of “alternative sexuality”) a higher priority than conventionally prurient material?
Differences in categorization schemes produce another axis of inconsistency, which we can see by
comparing K9’s categories to those anticipated by OpenDNS, another popular filtering company and
subsidiary of networking giant Cisco. Its primary filtering product, known as Umbrella, is specifically
targeted at the K–12 educational market, and invokes CIPA compliance in its advertising, which also
claims a client base of 40,000 schools. Six of our respondents rely on OpenDNS for filtering.
Like K9, OpenDNS offers a range of preconfigured options. As can be seen in Figure 4 (below), it
offers three instead of five, with its “high” setting calibrated to exclude “all adult-related sites, illegal
activity, social networking sites, video sharing sites, and general time-wasters.” Similarly, it provides 59
categories, foregoing K9’s “Extreme” but adding “German Youth Protection,” possibly to assist
international clients using OpenDNS to comply with the German equivalent of CIPA.

International Journal of Communication 11(2017)
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Figure 4. OpenDNS Configuration at Carol Municipal Library.

Figure 4 records the custom OpenDNS configuration of a library located in a small town (pop.
~2,600) in southeastern Alabama that serves ~7,900 computer users annually. Note the partial overlap
with the other two municipal libraries we have already seen, and the marked difference in kinds of content
imagined to exist between the two systems. Again, despite a nominal compliance with a standard law, and
a generally similar community of constituents, the kind of information made available through this
intermediary again deviates not only from the standards of CIPA but from the practice of nearby
institutions.
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The variance between category scheme and selection seen in these three examples is typical of
the 30 category configurations we received: In our records, no two implementations of the same system
had the same selection of common categories, and no two filtering systems had the same category set.
Indeed,

different

filtering

products

often

compete

on

the

differences

in

number,

kind,

and

comprehensiveness of categories. Barracuda Networks, a publicly traded network security company used
by three of our respondents, offers a “Web Security Gateway [that] includes a preinstalled URL list
containing millions of URLs classified into 95 categories for easy and efficient content filtering” (Barry,
2015). Similarly, Trustwave, a cybersecurity subsidiary of Singaporean multinational telecommunications
conglomerate Singtel, promises to “[filter] millions of Web sites in 100+ categories—without impacting
bandwidth or productivity” (Trustwave, 2014, p. 1).
As such, while most filtering systems offer standard categories, the categories are not
standardized: Indeed, differences between systems produce a perceived comparative advantage in the
market as filtering companies contend for clients. If every software system offered the same categories,
populated by the same websites and operating with the same rules, filtering providers would have fewer
things to compete upon. The inconsistency thus arises from both sides of the implementation: at the point
of design by the software company to produce a differentiated product, and at the point of configuration
by the administrator to meet their local preferences. To adapt the old software aphorism to the logic of the
market, the inconsistency of categories across filtering systems is not a bug, but a feature.
Strategy B: Lists That Forbid or Permit
Sometimes, however, features fail, and infrastructures do not work as expected, becoming
suddenly visible upon breakdown (Star, 1999, p. 382). In the case of filtering, this most commonly
happens when a site that should be accessible is not, or conversely, when something that should be
blocked is not. These edge cases are a signal that the categories (meaning in this case both the
conceptual schema and the mechanisms that populate them) are overly exclusive or inclusive.
In these cases, software systems, like other infrastructures, are held together with what Star
called “articulation work” (Star, 1999, p. 385). Articulation work refers to the process of naming (and
taming) the “monsters” (Haraway, 1992) that resist the naturalization of categories (Bowker & Star, 1999,
p. 310). As Gerson and Star (1986) put it, “articulation is [necessary] because the definition of adequate
provision shifts according to local circumstances . . . [systems] must be aligned or tailored to a set of
implementation conditions that cannot be fully specified ahead of time” (p. 258). The (often invisible)
work of articulation can be found by “looking for these processes in the traces left behind by coders,
designers, and users of systems” (Star, 1999, p. 385).
In the case of filtering systems, articulation is often accomplished by lists: blacklists (links or
expressions that are always blocked) and whitelists (links or expressions that are always permitted) that
override the standard scheme and selection of categories. By allowing/enacting adjustments around the
edges of categories, these lists “[package] a compromise . . . that closes the system locally and
temporarily so that work can go on” (Gerson & Star, 1986, p. 266). In a filtering system, lists of links and
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other expression are thus both form and function: durable inscriptions that simultaneously record and
perform the work of articulation (Johnson, 1988).
For example, consider Figure 5, a (partial) record of the blacklist implemented by a public school
district in a Birmingham suburb.
At first glance, this list resembles what the media scholar Ian Bogost, in his study of the
philosophical function of lists, describes as “a pile of incoherent crap spilled at the foot of the reader”
(Bogost, 2012, p. 41). Upon closer inspection, however, some patterns emerge: The IP addresses ending
in /GALLERY/, /RANDOM/, and /NEXT/ are (or were) all part of the Wordle text-cloud platform; the
hubristic CANTBLOCK.ME is a proxy server for routing around school filters; Facebook, Snapchat, and
Gmail require little explanation in the context of schools cracking down on peer communication. However,
the rationale behind other decisions is harder to infer, such as the decision to blacklist WestEgg.com, the
personal website of Manhattanite Morgan Friedman, who describes himself as “a language-loving polyglot
[who is] good at getting people really excited about things.” (“Steven Morgan Friedman, n.d., p. 2).

Figure 5. Configuration of David City Schools blacklist.
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Figure 6. Configuration of David City Schools whitelist.
Meanwhile, the (partial) whitelist from the same school shows the mirror image of sites that local
administrators inscribed to specifically permit (see Figure 6). The whitelist is several pages longer than the
blacklist, suggesting that the filtering software blocks more things that need to be accessed than the other
way around. Jostled together we find The New York Times, Mashable, and MexConnect, “an electronic
magazine devoted to providing quality information about Mexico, and promoting Mexico to the world” (“All
About MexConnect,” n.d., p. 1).
In the previous section, we demonstrated inconsistencies in the design and selection of the
anticipatory work performed by categories. In the case of the articulation work performed by lists, we see
inconsistencies not only across institutions but even within institutions. The administrators of David City
Schools block Gmail and Snapchat but permit Pinterest and Twitter and have added Facebook to both the
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blacklist and the whitelist. The inconsistencies made apparent by these lists invite further inquiry into the
local controversies and decisions made by institutional administrators.
Strategy C: Mixing Agencies—Public and Private; Algorithms and Engineers
In “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” Star (1999) quotes the anthropologist Gregory Bateson
to observe that infrastructures are properly understood/studied as “a relationship or an infinite regress of
relationships” (Bateson, as cited in Star, 1999, p. 379). Star deploys this epigram to introduce a
discussion of some methodological challenges to studying infrastructures. The sprawl of infrastructure
across time, space, and kinds of actors—where studying an irrigation system involves understanding the
work of piping, policies, and plumbers alike—means that, as Ananny and Crawford (2016) argue,
rather than privileging a type of accountability that needs to look inside systems, that
we instead hold systems accountable by looking across them—seeing them as
sociotechnical systems that do not contain complexity but enact complexity by
connecting to and intertwining with assemblages of humans and non-humans. (p. 2,
emphasis in original)
The complex sprawl of filtering systems, which include general categories and local lists,
classifying algorithms and configuring administrators, provides responsive parties with the flexibility to
distribute authority, credit, or blame to other agents entangled in the assemblage. In our study, we found
this complexity enacted as such in a third strategy deployed by our respondents to tailor filtering systems
to local needs. Unlike Strategies A and B, this strategy does not arise from our respondents’ skilled use of
technological features built into the filtering system but rather from the complexity of the system itself, as
respondents appeal to the many and different kinds of actors entangled in a filtering system when they
justify their implementation.
Sometimes, these appeals take the form of emergent alliances, where an actor enrolls other
actors, both humans and nonhuman, into alliances to make and defend certain arguments (Latour, 2005).
Consider, for example, the request shown in Figure 7, received in 2006 by a public library in northeastern
Alabama, by an adult patron asking the library to unblock Myspace for (in the language of both CIPA and
the Supreme Court) a bona fide lawful purpose.
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Figure 7. Request from a patron to unblock Myspace.
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Figure 8. Response to patron’s request to unblock Myspace.

In this case the patron, writing on behalf of the organization Extreme Student Ministries,
complains that without access to Myspace, which serves as the organizing platform and event calendar for
local Bible studies, they will be unable to “share the gospel.” In response, the library’s director, cc’ing its
ordained board chair, refuses to unblock Myspace, and justifies this decision by appealing to both CIPA
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and their collection development policy (see Figure 8). The library director thus enrolls ministers, federal
legislation, and local policy in an unlikely alliance to defend its filtering regime against evangelicals and
Myspace, and in contradiction to the Supreme Court’s requirement that legitimate content be unblocked
for bona fide legitimate purposes.
Another useful complexity derives from the flexible relationship between public institutions,
private corporations, government discounts, and noncommercial developers. Most public institutions
purchase licenses for filtering systems built and maintained by external organizations. As discussed briefly
in Strategy A, and covered more extensively by Zittrain and Palfrey’s (2008) review of commercial filtering
software, there are strong business incentives involved: The information security companies that provide
filtering are routinely valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and business is booming in the current
era of concern over hacking and malware. Of our respondents, five provided information about their
contracts with filtering companies:
●

Eve County Schools pays $6,160 annually for 1,100 Sophos licenses.

●

Frank Public Library pays $655 annually for 50 iPrism (a product of EdgeWave) licenses.

●

David City Schools pays $3,483 annually for Internet service, including filtering, provided at no

●

Grace County Public Library pays $828 annually for Internet service, including filtering, provided

●

Heidi Public Library pays $870 annually for Internet service, including filtering, provided at an

discount by Alabama Supercomputer Authority.
at a 77% discount by Alabama Supercomputer Authority.
80% discount by Alabama Supercomputer Authority.
Of these, Sophos is a publicly traded British company with annual revenues of ~$450 million in
2015, whereas EdgeWave is a privately held American company without public revenue numbers. By
comparison, Alabama Supercomputer Authority (ASA) is a state-funded nonprofit corporation that offers
telecommunications services to Alabaman schools and libraries. More than half of our respondents indicate
they rely on ASA for their filtering services. However, this too is a regress: According to ASA, they
subcontract their filtering to iBoss, a privately held cybersecurity company valued at ~$500 million in
2015 (Alabama Supercomputer Authority, n.d.) The nesting doll nature of filtering companies not only
creates confusion among patrons and administrators as to which agency is responsible for any given
filtering outcome but also operates in direct contradiction to professional norms forbidding librarians from
outsourcing content selection to private entities (Batch, 2014).
Not all filtering providers are multinational information security corporations, however. Consider
the case of DansGuardian, which is, as it turns out, a free and open-source content filtering system coded
by a man named Dan. According to his “How I Did It” page, around the year 2000 Dan thought that other
content filtering providers were “rubbish,” so he learned C++ and built one himself. The product, Dan
promises, “filters the actual content of pages . . . [not] on a banned list of sites like lesser totally
commercial filters. DansGuardian is designed to be completely flexible and allows you to tailor the filtering
to your exact needs” (DansGuardian, 2011, p. 2; see Figure 9). Although Dan is now CTO of a private
filtering company and no longer maintains his eponymous project, the software remains freely available
and actually implemented to achieve CIPA compliance by at least two Alabaman public libraries.
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Figure 9. An explanation of DansGuardian, written by Dan.
While Dan locates filtering agency “in” his code, other providers distribute it across a network of
actors. In a corporate blog post addressing CIPA compliance, a Barracuda employee assures
administrators that its “preclassified” blacklist of URLs is “continuously updated by engineers at Barracuda
Central and delivered hourly via the Energize Updates subscription service sold with the Barracuda Web
Filter,” which can then be manipulated further by local technicians (Barry, 2015, p. 5). Indeed, the
marketing materials of filtering companies at once presume and reflect the complexity of filtering systems,
prescribing local administrators toggling categories populated by algorithms, coded by engineers, to meet
a market opportunity induced by federal legislation, impelled by moral panics, implemented by
understaffed institutions, to serve fickle patrons.
When viewed from this perspective, it seems unsurprising (even inevitable) that this long chain of
associations can produce inconsistent filtering results; indeed, their complexity makes it almost inevitable.
As the anthropologist Nick Seaver (2013) observes:
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When we realize that we are not talking about algorithms in the technical sense, but
rather algorithmic systems of which code strictu sensu is only a part, their defining
features reverse: instead of formality, rigidity, and consistency, we find flux, revisability,
and negotiation. . . . These algorithmic systems are not standalone little boxes, but
massive, networked ones with hundreds of hands reaching into them, tweaking and
tuning, swapping out parts and experimenting with new arrangements. (p. 10)
While Seaver was writing primarily on the topic of social media systems, the same dynamic
obtains for the filtering systems implemented by public institutions.
Conclusion
In this article, we shared the results of a study of Internet filtering configurations in Alabama
public schools and libraries. We compared configurations of the same TPMs across different institutions, as
well as different TPMs across different institutions, to demonstrate significant inconsistencies in the kinds
of content blocked or permitted by them. We demonstrated that these inconsistencies are produced by
differentiations in the design and implementation of filtering systems across institutions that make
strategic use of categories, lists, and complexity to perform the anticipation, articulation, and interpretive
work required of institutions charged with making information (un)available.
Our findings are significant for two reasons. First, they contribute to the Internet filtering
literature by showing how, and what kinds of, inconsistencies arise in the everyday work of Internet
filtering. As we discussed in our literature review, prior studies have largely treated filters as stable,
universal objects that are either adopted or not, or examined individual filters with global settings “built
into” the software to assess “error rates.” By comparing specific, local implementations of filtering
systems, and illuminating the complex network of actors entangled within them, we have illustrated a
more detailed picture of how filters, and those who configure them, work to simultaneously produce local
order and global disorder. The inconsistencies that arise in Internet filtering are not merely the result of
“errors” in their software but the product of different design choices in category schemas driven by market
competition, as well as different configuration choices made by local administrators driven by institutional
preferences.
As such, the effect of Internet filtering practiced by our respondents often reaches far beyond the
narrow social function contemplated by Congress with CIPA or approved by the Supreme Court that
upheld it, a finding consistent with recent ALA reports on overbroad filtering (Batch, 2014). This finding is
troubling because it supports the conclusion that public subsidies both require and fund a broader form of
arbitrary institutional control over information than was ever publicly legislated or litigated. As people who
work as and with librarians, we understand, and are sympathetic to, the practical difficulties faced by
administrators who must balance many competing (and sometimes contradictory) norms in the course of
their jobs. However, with this article we hope to illuminate the gap between the text of the law and its
implementation to help reinvigorate the legal and professional debates about how and why Internet
filtering is and ought to be practiced by public institutions.
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The second reason our finding is significant is that the inconsistent access to information
mediated by the TPMs of public institutions resembles other inconsistencies in the information made
(un)available through other contemporary intermediaries. As discussed in our introduction, there is a
rapidly developing body of literature in communication and media studies investigating (a) how certain
information is made more or less visible through social media, search engines, and other networked
information intermediaries; (b) which agents determine this visibility/availability; and (c) the potential
implications for democracy. These questions remain contested: One of the more comprehensive recent
reviews was conducted by Flaxman, Goel, and Rao (2016), who “uncovered evidence for both sides of the
debate” (p. 318) as to whether contemporary information access patterns encourage the integration or
dissolution of what Benkler (2006) famously described as a networked public sphere.
It is outside the scope of this article to resolve this ongoing debate. We do, however, want to link
the inconsistencies observed across both private and public intermediaries as parallel phenomena. Recent
literature regarding the consequences of curation have taken Twitter (Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith,
2013), Facebook (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015), and cable news channels (Arceneaux & Johnson,
2013) as their subject to study how inconsistencies across intermediaries may influence different
understandings of the world. Because public schools and libraries continue to play a major role as Internet
intermediaries to millions of Americans, it seems reasonable to ask whether and how the inconsistent
filtering practiced by these institutions influences the worldviews of those who rely on them for access.
Consider, for example, the sites and services mentioned in our introductory story. One of our
respondents,

a

public

school

district,

used

Lightspeed

and

blocked

“Adult”

while

permitting

“Society.Politics.” Another school district uses Websense and blocks “Entertainment” while permitting
“News and Media.” Because of how these systems categorize websites, and the category selections made
by school administrators, this means that staff and students at these two schools are likely prevented
from reading Jezebel or Buzzfeed at school while allowed to freely browse Breitbart and InfoWars with
their publicly subsidized Internet. While we do not propose a crudely deterministic relationship for this
kind of information environment, it is difficult to imagine that it is entirely without consequence, both for
the individuals involved and the society in which they participate.
In future work, we intend to extend this project in several respects. First, as mentioned above,
we hope to expand our current approach to a stratified sample of institutions from more states to cover
more literal and figurative ground for additional analysis. Second, we anticipate that deeper qualitative
work, particularly ethnography and/or interviews with institutional administrators and users, would further
illuminate the rich complexity of their lived experiences more than our documentary traces can do. To this
end, we look forward to a new project, announced while this article was being revised, by Kozak and
Zimmer to conduct unstructured interviews regarding filtering implementation with public librarians in
Wisconsin (Zimmer, 2017), which we believe will complement our work. Third, we hope to partner with
other scholars, professional organizations, and other interested parties to reconsider the cultural work of
Internet filtering in public institutions, with renewed focus on the influential intermediary role they play
when it comes to learning about, and participating in, the common world.
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